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1The wage-wage-...-wage-proﬁtr e l a t i o ni na
multisector bargaining economy
1 Introduction
Economists who spend time with wage regressions say that statistically visible diﬀerences
between workers can explain no more than 30 percent of the variation in cross sections of
the workers’ wages (Mortensen, 2003). Industry-level wage diﬀerentials capture a great
part of the residual dispersion, and orderings of industries by the wages paid in them are
surprisingly resilient over time and across national economies (Gittleman and Wolﬀ, 1993;
Krueger and Summers, 1988). Students of income distribution in capitalist societies can
do a lot worse than to study the industry structure of wages.
This paper is about the wage structures generated by bargaining in a Leontief
circulating-capital economy. I suppose that wages are set in Nash bargains between
transiently matched workers and capitalists, and I consider systems of goods prices and
wages that equalize rates of proﬁt over all sectors of production.
This idealization is interesting, I hope, from at least four diﬀerent points of view. For one
thing it’s an easy place in which to make the point that if many goods are produced by
goods and labor, a simple bargaining mechanism is enough to send indistinguishable
workers home with diﬀerent wages. In one-sector models equilibrium wage dispersion
tends to be cooked up from some mixture of imperfect competition in the market for the
one good, a dispersion of ﬁrms’ technologies inside the frontier of eﬃcient production,
ﬁrm-level diﬀerences in the parameters of labor monitoring or training, and the strategic
2diﬀerentiation of wage oﬀers by employers competing for scarce workers to ﬁll vacant jobs.
The capitalists of this paper are by contrast price takers with access to a common
technology who face identically structured bargaining situations in which such
head-hunting rivalries play no part.
The paper is also a development of the analysis of stationary price systems for linear
production models, what Marx and Sraﬀa called prices of production. I think that, for all
the pleasures of logical jousting with Walrasian capital theory that beckoned along the
way, the original point of studying these objects was to better understand the
institutionally variable joint determination of prices, wages, and proﬁtability. If those
pleasures were ﬂeeting, the demand for understanding remains. To meet it calls for models
of institutionally variable wage-setting mechanisms, and here I try out one mechanism like
that.
Along with the classwide interests that arise from capitalist production relations, workers
and capitalists have interests special to the industries in which they work or invest which
pit them against their class fellows in other sectors. It’s a truism of the class analysis of
politics that inter-class conﬂict and intra-class conﬂict are each shaped by the speciﬁc
ways in which they’re combined. The third thing I do in the paper is to isolate some sharp
albeit abstract instances of this interaction. I show that the equilibrium wages of workers
in some industries can vary inversely with other workers’ wages and directly with the
uniform proﬁt rate, I distinguish cases in which proﬁtability bears an increasing relation to
wage inequality from cases in which that relation is decreasing, and I identify conditions
under which institutional changes that variously compress or decompress the equilibrium
wage distribution and raise or lower the equilibrium proﬁt rate might be championed by
cross-class coalitions made up of particular sections of the two classes.
3Finally the wage mechanism of this paper might matter to an economy’s direction of
technical change. I present one example in the line begun by Okishio (1961), pointing out
that in this bargaining closure of the price-of-production system innovations that raise
proﬁts in current prices can result in a lower equilibrium rate of proﬁt.
I hope it’s obvious that my arguments oﬀer only a limited explanatory handle on the
world. For one thing we lack any general demonstration that prices of production are
stable rest points of dynamical systems describing the motions of prices and production
activity directed by capitalists’ proﬁt-minded trading and investment decisions. Even if
stability in that sense were ensured, the process of convergence would be slow and nearly
opaque to its participants, so it’s hard to imagine that equilibrium comparisons of the kind
that I’ll discuss could guide workers’ and capitalists’ stances in class struggle and
compromise. A far more interesting project than mine would show how stationary
nondegenerate distributions of wages and (while we’re at it) proﬁt rates emerge from the
joint evolution of prices, wages, capital allocation, and production technology, and would
endogenize workers’ and capitalists’ collective action as a constituent adaptive process of
the system that sustains them. Until that movie gets made, we’re stuck with snapshots
like the ones you’ll see here.
2 Prices of production with Nash wage bargains
Consider some capitalists who run activities from a Leontief technology described by a
couple (A,l). A, there, is a semipositive, indecomposable, productive n × n matrix whose
jth column aj lists the quantities of produced inputs needed to produce a unit of the jth
good; l,ap o s i t i v er o wn-vector whose jth coordinate lj gives the jth activity’s unit labor
requirement. Each capitalist enters a production period owning stocks of commodities
4produced in the previous period, chooses a production plan that maximizes proﬁts subject
to a budget constraint in those stocks and prices p, and buys the required commodity
inputs.
She also tries to hire the required labor in a market for costlessly enforceable one-period
employment contracts with wages to be paid at the end of the period. This market closes
after a single round of matching, so matched workers and capitalists who fail to agree on a
wage rate are out of work or business for the period. Let pj and wj be the price of the jth
good and the wage paid in the jth activity. A capitalist who plans to run that activity
takes pjl
−1
j − wj per worker if production goes ahead; if not, her fallback is the value of
the inputs that she’d planned to tie up with the worker, pajl−1
j . I assume that
capitalistically unemployed workers receive a payment υ,t h eoutside wage,w h i c hy o uc a n
understand as an unemployment beneﬁt or as income available from economic activity
outside the capitalist sector. For some β in [0,1)–call this weight workers’ power,a n dl e t
it take the same value in every activity–a generalized Nash bargain maximizes the













j +( 1− β)υ, (1)
a weighted average of the capitalist’s value added per worker and the outside wage.
Faced with stationary prices p, capitalists who anticipate the wage bargains (1) are
indiﬀerent between committing capital to the diﬀerent activities if and only if those prices
5satisfy
pj =( 1 + r)paj + wjlj (2)






paj + υlj (3)
for some r ≥ 0. So a price system that supports the production of all n goods by
proﬁtmaximizing capitalists and that takes a working-class consumption basket d as
num´ eraire looks like
p∗ =
³
1+r∗ (1 − β)
−1´
p∗A + υl, (4)
p∗d =1 . (5)
You can next ﬂesh this out by showing that some vector of activity levels clears all the
goods markets at these prices on one or another assumption about capitalists’ and
workers’ tastes. I won’t do this, though, since all the structure I need is in the wage and
price system, (1,4,5), which follows from proﬁt-rate equalization under the Nash
bargaining rule whatever the quantity relations you impose on it.
If this bargaining set-up seems rigged to rationalize the wage equation (1), you might
prefer to skip the set-up and start the discussion at (1). The paper’s topic is then just the
question, What follows if every capitalist pays each of her workers a convex combination of
her operated activity’s value added per head and an outside wage? From this point of view
(1) stands in for any bargaining process that splits the diﬀerence between ceilings given by
capitalists’ revenues net of material input costs and an economywide wage ﬂoor.1 For
1Where υ is identiﬁed with a subsistence wage, (1) conjures up Sraﬀa’s view of the “double character of
the wage” as including “besides the ever-present element of subsistence ... a share of the surplus product.”
6example you might entertain this as a rough-and-ready representation of enterprise- or
industry-level collective bargaining subject to a uniform dole or strike beneﬁt υ.
I need, though, to ﬂag one analytically crucial contrivance. My assumptions that
employment is transient and that workers and capitalists can’t return to the market to
search for other production partners in the current period have the eﬀect of insulating the
wage bargain from the market’s degree of tightness or slack. An obvious next step is to
remove that insulation. But in opening the price-of-production system to endogenous wage
dispersion an interesting ﬁrst step is to choose the smallest changes that possibly
accommodate this. It’s in such a spirit of analytical gradualism that (1) preserves that
system’s signature decomposition between relative prices and macroeconomic quantities.
3 Relative wages and capital-labor ratios
One conclusion about the industry structure of wages is available right away. Substituting
for pj from (3) into (1) gives that
w∗




For any two operated activities j and k, then,
w∗
j − w∗










Sraﬀa himself expresses this idea by working with an exogenous and uniform real wage measured in units
of the economy’s given net output–in eﬀect a given share of wages in national income–which assumption
leaves him no way in which “to separate the two components of the wage.” (Sraﬀa, 1960, p.9) The wage
bargains (1), which share out value added at the level of the individual sectors rather than economywide,
bring the Sraﬃan “double character” of wages back to the surface. (See Franke (1981) and Burgstaller
(1995, pp.78-87) for developments of Sraﬀa’s wage-share closure. I thank Duncan Foley for suggesting that
I spell out the connection to Sraﬀa.)
7Wage diﬀerences in this bargaining equilibrium are proportional to diﬀerences in the
activities’ ratios of the value-of-produced-inputs to labor employed, so (7) is a starting
point for explaining the positive estimates of coeﬃcients on capital intensities that are an
outstanding result of interindustry wage regressions (Gittleman and Wolﬀ, 1993; Arai,
2003; and cf. Acemoglu, 1999).2 I plan to pursue that explanation in another paper, but I
think that its promise is reason enough to reconsider the comparative statics of income
distribution in multisector economies on the assumption that wages are dispersed by
bargaining as in (7).
Of course (7) does not say that relative wages fall out of the production technology alone.
The capital intensities on its righthand side are creatures of the price system associated
with a particular proﬁt rate, workers’ power, outside wage, and num´ eraire. So to
understand the wage structure any further you have to close that system.
4 A two-parameter family of equilibria
Suppose that state policy or living standards in the noncapitalist sector peg the real
outside wage in terms of the bundle d t oan u m b e rυ. And with far greater violence to
reality suppose that β is given by facts of the social and technical organization of
production that are independent of the processes of price and wage formation. Then you
can think of pairs (β,υ) as distributive parameters that deﬁne a family of
price-of-production systems.
2Interindustry wage inequality in these casual labor markets is consistent with equal expected personal
incomes: If every worker faces the same stationary probabilities of being hired for the diﬀerent activities,
every suﬃciently long-lived worker can expect to pass through high- and low-wage jobs in the same propor-
tions. To give wage dispersion some political bite, assume instead that a worker has a greater probability
of being hired for some activity in a later period if she’s employed on it now.





p∗A + υp∗dl (8)




1+r∗ (1 − β)
−1´−1
p∗. (9)
It’s readily checked that
[I − υdl]




where this inverse exists. For υ < (ld)
−1 the matrix A[I − υdl]
−1 is semipositive and
indecomposable. Let λF (A,l,υ,d) be its greatest eigenvalue, and suppress A,l,d to deﬁne
ρ(υ) ≡ λF (A,l,υ,d)
−1 − 1.
Then the proﬁtr a t eg i v e nb y
r∗ =( 1− β)ρ(υ)( 1 1 )
and the corresponding lefthand eigenvector, scaled so as to satisfy (5), are the only
candidate solution of (9) for 0 ≤ υ < (ld)
−1; no other root of the matrix has a strictly
positive eigenvector.
Where





(4,5) is solved with r∗ = 0. An indecomposable semipositive matrix’s maximum eigenvalue
9is strictly increasing in its elements, so
ρ0 (υ) < 0( 1 2 )
for 0 ≤ υ ≤ υmax < (ld)
−1. It follows that for any (β,υ)i n[ 0 ,1) × [0,υmax]t h e r e ’ sa
unique price-of-production bargaining equilibrium with a nonnegative proﬁtr a t et h a th a s
∂r∗
∂β




= ρ0 (υ) < 0. (14)
Equilibrium proﬁtability goes to zero as β approaches 1 or as υ goes to υmax, while at
β = υ = 0 it reaches a maximum equal to −1 plus the reciprocal of A’s greatest root–the
maximum proﬁt rate familiar from square production models with uniform wages.3
This negative dependence of proﬁtability on workers’ power and the outside wage recalls
the inverse wage-proﬁt relation that holds across the equal-proﬁt-rate equilibria of those
uniform-wage models. However I have not yet said anything about wages here. Turning to





j + υ,j =1 ,...,n, (15)
picked out by the possible pairs (β,υ). In relation to the equilibrium proﬁtr a t et h e s e
describe, not a curve in the plane, but a surface in an n + 1-dimensional space, a
wage-wage-...-wage-proﬁt relation. I claim next that as workers’ power β increases at a
3The last two paragraphs are indebted to the analysis of that uniform-wage case in Kurz and Salvadori
(1995, pp. 100-101).
10constant value of υ so that the proﬁt rate falls, all these activity-speciﬁc real wages
increase. Section 6 shows that no similar conclusion is available in the case of a pure
variation in the outside wage. An increase in υ, even as it calls for a lower equilibrium
proﬁt rate, can require lower real wages in some of the activities. Capital-labor
antagonism is tangled up with and its monotonicity possibly disrupted by the distinct
relation of labor to labor under study here.
5 Variation of workers’ power
A particular value of υ picks out a single version of the eigen problem (9) whose solution
immediately gives the equilibrium prices for that economy. Prices are invariant with








Wages increase, and the proﬁt rate falls, as workers’ power rises–a classical insight is
borne out. Moreover along the continuum of equilibria swept out by the variation of β at a











since they all solve the same problem (9). In this limited respect the linear wage-proﬁt
relation of Ricardo’s corn model is recovered without resort to a standard commodity or a
labor theory of value.
If the capitalists run the various production activities at levels x that are independent of
wage and proﬁt rates, the national income p∗ [I − A]x is also invariant with respect to β,
so from (16) wages’ share in the national income is increasing in that parameter.
11Consider next the wage structure (15). A pure increase in bargaining power ampliﬁes any




















the righthand side is positive or negative according as j is more or less capital-intensive
than k in the going prices.
Where the composition of output x is again taken as constant, the jth sector’s wage

























=s i g nθj (19)
as can be seen by substituting for ak and lk in (17) the composite activity (Ax,lx). So any
measure of wage inequality that’s increasing in the absolute values of these diﬀerentials is
increasing in β.
The invariance of prices with respect to β entitles you to conclude from the local
comparative statics (17) that wage diﬀerentials are in fact absolutely globally increasing in
β for a given technology, num´ eraire, and outside wage. Greater bargaining power for
workers implies higher wages across the board but also greater inequality among workers,
and this direction of parametric change supports a downsloping relation between the proﬁt
rate and wage inequality.
126 Variation of the outside wage
I turn to comparisons of the equilibria picked out by diﬀerent values of the outside wage at
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deﬁning z∗ by












−p∗aj + ρ(υ)((z∗d)p∗ − z∗)aj¤
+1 ( 2 2 )






















wherever the outermost expressions are not in fact equal.4 Barring the ﬂuke of equal
equilibrium capital intensities, then, the righthand side of (23) is strictly negative for at
least one activity. So for (β,υ) in some
£¯ β,1
¢
× [¯ υ,υmax] the equilibrium wage in the
sector with the locally greatest value of capital per head is decreasing in the outside wage.
And since the proﬁt rate is everywhere decreasing in υ, it follows that in this parametric
4Suppose the second inequality in (24) were false and the ﬁrst true. Then z∗dυl ≥ p∗A. (Here and
throughout x = y ⇔ xi ≥ yi,a l li; x>y⇔ xi >y i,a l li; x ≥ y ⇔ x = y and x 6= y.) Postmultiplying by
the strictly positive [I − (1 + ρ(υ))A]−1,y o uh a v ez∗dp∗ >z ∗. But dotting both sides into d produces the
contradiction z∗d>z ∗d. A symmetrical argument shows that the ﬁrst inequality can’t fail to hold if the
second holds.
13region it’s true of at least one sector that the sector-speciﬁc wage-proﬁt relation induced
by a pure variation in the outside wage slopes up.
This ambiguous behavior of individual wages nonetheless washes out of the comparative
statics of the aggregate wage share. From (1) the economywide wage bill when capitalists
run activities at the intensities x is
X
j
wjljxj = βp∗ [I − A]x +( 1− β)υlx, (25)




p∗ [I − A]x
= β +( 1− β)
υlx
p∗ [I − A]x
. (26)
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(lx)z∗ [I − A]x
(z∗d)(p∗ [I − A]x)
2 > 0( 2 8 )
after a substitution from (57) in the appendix: The wage share is increasing in the outside
wage.
































If the partial derivatives of the prices with respect to υ were to vanish, you could infer that
the righthand side of (29) is negative if and only if j has the greater value of capital per
head and hence a greater wage. And evidently the same inference is good for price partials
in a small-enough neighborhood of zero. Let “C” hold place for the unknown conditions
on technology, the outside wage, and the num´ eraire that conﬁne these derivatives to that
neighborhood. Given C wage diﬀerentials with respect to an employment-weighted mean
wage are also absolutely decreasing in υ. (Again this follows by letting k in (29) stand for
the composite activity (Ax,lx).) By (14), then, a pure variation in the outside wage picks
out, under C,a nupsloping relation between capitalist proﬁtability and an appropriate
index of working-class inequality.5
Collecting the partial derivatives calculated in this section and the last two, you can ﬁnally
write




















and use these to approximate the displacements of equilibrium required by small changes
5B yt h es a m et o k e ni fC is unavailable because the “price-Wicksell eﬀect” terms in the derivative (29)
are large and uncooperative, you can say nothing systematic about wage dispersion’s dependence on the
outside wage. Analysis is frustrated by the same arbitrary behavior of relative prices that is the heart of
the “Cambridge” problems in capital theor
15in (β,υ). They imply that there’s an interval of directions of parametric change under
which the jth wage and the uniform proﬁt rate increase together, though of course this
possibility is just a generic property of pairs of functions on the plane. The economically
interesting increasingness result is this section’s earlier conclusion that the proﬁt rate can
vary directly with some industry’s wage even where just one parameter, υ, is perturbed.
7 Working-class cleavage
An old radical tradition holds that it’s possible for privileged workers to join the
capitalists in taking a surplus from the working class as a whole. In all but the ﬁnal
paragraph of this section I use a less conceptually fraught counterfactual strategy for
classifying working-class privilege. Instead of trying to map the disposition of a surplus
within a single equilibrium position, I compare how diﬀerent groups of workers would fare
in moving from that position to some interesting benchmarks.6
Take ﬁrst an economy described by a (β,υ)w i t hβ > 0 and consider parametric changes
that sustain proﬁtability at its equilibrium value, r(β,υ). The point of this constraint
might be that changes which violate it are doomed to draw political resistance from the
capitalists. Or perhaps this proﬁt rate is necessary for constant unemployment given
capitalists’ saving decisions and the growth rate of the working population. Now let
¯ w(β,υ) ≡
1
l[I − (1 + r(β,υ))A]
−1 d
so that
r(0, ¯ w(β,υ)) = r(β,υ);
6Compare Wright (1997, pp. 14-6).
16¯ w(β,υ)i st h eg r e a t e s tuniform wage that meets the proﬁtability constraint. For any
β > 0, there are j and k such that
wj (β,υ) > ¯ w(β,υ) >w k (β,υ)
except where wages are already equal in the equilibrium for (β,υ).7 So the project of
equalizing wages without depressing the general proﬁt rate necessarily cleaves the class
into two opposed sections: one group who would gain from it and a second group of losers.
For a second counterfactual classiﬁcation of working-class cleavage, suppose that wages are






that sends the proﬁt rate to zero. In the actual equilibrium
wj (β,υ)lj = β
¡
pj − paj¢
+( 1− β)υlj, (32)
so the vector of unit labor costs is
γ (β,υ) ≡ (w1l1,w 2l2,...,wnln)=βp[I − A]+( 1− β)υl (33)
from which
γ (β,υ)[I − A]




7Suppose to the contrary it were possible that wj (β,υ) ≤ ¯ w (β,υ) for all j with wk (β,υ) < ¯ w(β,υ)f o r
some k.T h e nf r o m( 3 )
p(β,υ) − (1 + r (β,υ))p(β,υ)A ≤ ¯ w(β,υ)l;
dot both sides into the strictly positive vector [I − (1 + r (β,υ))A]−1 d to get the contradiction
p[I − (1 + r (β,υ))A][I − (1 + r(β,υ))A]−1 d =1> ¯ w(β,υ)l[I − (1 + r (β,υ))A]−1 d =1 .




γ (β,υ)[I − A]
−1 d =1= ¯ wmaxl[I − A]
−1 d. (35)




















wj (β,υ)( 3 7 )
except where wages are equal by a ﬂuke. It follows that for any υ < ¯ wmax there’s a
¯ β (υ) < 1 such that
β ≥ ¯ β (υ) ⇒∃ j,k : wj (β,υ) > ¯ wmax >w k (β,υ). (38)
Workers in at least one industry are better oﬀ in a status quo marked by positive proﬁts
and dispersed wages than after an egalitarian fan shen that abolishes proﬁts while
levelling all wage diﬀerentials. Were they to try to maximize their equilibrium wages
subject to the model of this paper, these workers would side with the capitalists against
the remaining workers.
At this point my warning from the start of the paper kicks in. You can’t step too heavily
on these kinds of equilibrium comparisons when you go to explain the course of struggle
over institutional change. Even if these bargaining equilibria were asymptotically stable in
a price and investment dynamics, people would be too harried to compute the
comparisons, and they would likely put a lot of weight on how they might fare in the
18transition. The next section steps around these diﬃculties by considering workers and
capitalists who take a less Olympian view of their economic interests.
Before leaving (38), though, I should point out that it invites a second, old-school gloss.
The quantity l[I − A]
−1 d, the reciprocal of the maximum uniform wage measured in
d-units, is also just the labor embodied in one unit of d bundles. And (38) says that for
great enough β,t h e r ea r ej and k with
wj (β,υ)l[I − A]
−1 d>1 >w k (β,υ)l[I − A]
−1 d,
workers who have respectively more and less labor embodied in their wage bundles than
they contribute to production. If β is big enough, bargaining partitions the class into a
Marxianly exploited stratum and a stratum of Marxian exploiters.
8 Institutional innovation
Consider an economy that’s in the price-of-production bargaining equilibrium for some
(β,υ) and suppose that workers and capitalists can act to secure small perturbations of
those parameters which they believe will leave the prices of produced commodities
unchanged. Such myopia excuses people from working out the equilibrium eﬀects of their
decisions; it also creates the possibility of interesting conﬂict among the capitalists, whose
interests in equilibrium changes are identical by deﬁnition.
From (6) a myopic break-even line for wages or proﬁts in the jth activity is




dβ;( 3 9 )
19capitalists in the jth sector should accept or reject a small change in the direction given by
(dβ,dυ) according as it lies below or above this line, and the sector’s workers should strike
the opposite stance.
Evidently no change draws unanimous support in the two classes. Suppose therefore that
within each class political weights adding up to 1 are distributed over the sectors and that
a coalition of sectors all of whose members accept some deal under the myopic rule (39)
can impose it on the remaining members of their class if their weights sum to more than
.5. A given assignment of weights picks out a unique classwide break-even line such that
only deals to one side of that line are possibly imposed. I’ll say that a class has a more or
less capital-intensive political center of gravity according as this classwide break-even line
has absolutely greater or lesser slope.
For any weighting that assigns distinct centers of gravity to the two classes, there’s a set of
institutional changes that dominant coalitions in both classes would opt to impose on
everyone else. Imposable deals have β increasing and υ decreasing if the workers’ political
center of gravity is more capital-intensive than the capitalists’ center, and they show the
opposite proﬁle in the opposite case. In particular the political alignment most favorable
to a social-democratic Great Compression of wage rates puts all the workers’ weight on the
most labor-intensive sector and all the capitalists’ weight on the most capital-intensive
sectors, while the inverse polarization promotes wage-dispersing exchanges of greater
workers’ power for a lower outside wage.
From (30) the break-even line for the equilibrium proﬁtr a t ei s
dυ = −(1 − β)
−1 ρ(υ)[υz∗d]dβ. (40)
20By (24) this must lie between the myopic break-even lines (39) for the activities that are
most and least capital-intensive in the equilibrium prices. If an omniscient executive
committee of the bourgeoisie were distributing weights over the myopic sectoral actors to
maximize the induced increase in the equilibrium proﬁt rate, it would assign to capitalists
an intermediate center of gravity that coincides with (40), and it would send all the
workers’ weight either to the most-capital-intensive activities or to the
most-labor-intensive ones so that all imposable deals raise the equilibrium proﬁtr a t e .
Proﬁtability is best served by the combination of this middle-of-the-road capitalist
coalition with either a capital- or a labor-intensive worker coalition, and it’s served worst
by the opposite scenario: Where workers’ weight centers on the break-even line for
equilibrium proﬁtability and capitalists lean toward one or the other sectoral extreme,
imposable deals always bring down the general proﬁtr a t e .
Though it’s hard to say more at this level of abstraction, these claims give some idea of
the explanatory payoﬀ to political-economy arguments that cross the two classes with n
sectors of production. The dependence of directions of change on sectoral political
alignments that shows up here might help to account for the diﬀerential evolution of
wage-setting systems.8 And since political arrangements that depress proﬁtability are
especially vulnerable to disruption, these alignments’ induced eﬀects on the general proﬁt
rate can help to explain their diﬀerential longevity.
8Ferguson (1984) and Swenson (2002) explain inter- and post-war capital-labor accords as the projects
of speciﬁc sectoral coalitions, and Swenson argues that diﬀerences in the terms of these compromises in
Sweden and the US are explained in part by diﬀerences in the coalitions’ industrial compositions.
219 Collectively self-defeating technical change
Apart from regulating institutional evolution in these ways, the bargaining arrangements
of this paper impinge on an economy’s direction of technical change. This section presents
one example of the diﬀerence bargaining can make.
In a circulating-capital model closed by an exogenously constant uniform real wage, the
introduction of activities that raise capitalists’ proﬁts in current equilibrium prices
necessarily induces a new equilibrium with a strictly greater rate of proﬁt (Okishio 1961).
Wages and the proﬁt rate are both endogenous to the equilibria I’m discussing, so this
constant-wage experiment is unavailable to me. What I can consider, though, are the
displacements of equilibrium brought about by proﬁtmaximizing technical change holding
constant the distributive parameters (β,υ). I’ll show that there’s a class of technical
changes whose adoption increases individual proﬁts in the old prices yet lowers the
equilibrium proﬁt rate if bargaining power and the outside wage are unchanged.
In this bargaining economy the technological upshot of the proﬁt motive depends on the
timing of wage bargains and technological learning. Making an opportunistic choice from
the wealth of plausible scenarios, I assume that innovation follows bargaining and is
unanticipated by it.9




.S h es i g n sa
costlessly enforceable contract for a worker’s labor at the wage given by (1) for the
9I mean that I’m choosing these over the alternatives because they have the possibly interesting impli-
cation that proﬁtmaximizing innovation can induce a lower equilibrium proﬁt rate. You will want to keep
reading the section if (a) you believe that capitalist growth has included episodes of declining proﬁtability
that invite a technological-cum-social explanation, or (b) you enjoy hearing stories about other people’s
self-defeating behavior. I should point out that the myopia of the capitalists of the text is in the spirit
of Okishio (1961), which studied the technological implications of current-period proﬁt maximization. My
discussion follows Roemer (1981)’s version of the Okishio argument.






















j ¯ lj +( 1− β)υ¯ lj,






j − (1 + r∗)p∗¯ aj + βl−1
j ¯ ljp∗aj − (1 − β)υ¯ lj > 0. (41)









≡ (1 + ρ(υ))p∗aj + υlj. (42)
This cost, which for the original jth activity just equals the equilibrium price of the jth
good, values produced inputs at prices marked up by the factor 1 + ρ(υ)a n dl a b o ra tt h e
outside wage υ. This is in fact the cost that capitalists would minimize who were able to
choose production activities before they bargain over wages. But it’s irrelevant to the
current proﬁt maximization problem. Its importance and my point in calling it “collective”
instead emerge from behind the backs of the capitalists in the following argument.











lj − ¯ lj
¢
< (1 + ρ(υ))p∗ ·
©
¯ aj − ajª
. (43)
In the appendix I show that for given values of the distributive parameters and a given
initial technology you can always construct a positive-measure set of new activities that
23satisfy both inequalities (41) and (43) in the associated equilibrium prices. A switch to
any of the activities in this set raises the value of capital requirements while reducing labor
requirements,
lj −¯ lj > 0 >p ∗ ·
©
aj − ¯ ajª
, (44)
which is to say that they ﬁt the proﬁle of “Marx-biased” technical change.








, write the social
technology formed by replacing aj with ¯ aj and lj with ¯ lj in (A,l)a s
¡ ¯ A,¯ l
¢
,a n dl e tα and
¯ α be the vectors of collective costs in current prices corresponding to the two technologies.
Innovation increases the collective cost of producing the jth good, so
(1 + ρ(υ))p∗ ¯ A + υ¯ l =¯ α ≥ α = p∗. (45)
Rearrange this using the num´ eraire condition to get
(1 + ρ(υ))p∗ ¯ A ≥ p∗ − υp∗d¯ l. (46)
Provided that υ¯ ld ≤ 1, it follows in light of (10) that
p∗ ¯ A
£
I − υd¯ l
¤−1 ≥ λF (A,l,υ,d)p∗. (47)
(If instead υ¯ ld > 1, the new technology doesn’t support a nonnegative proﬁt rate, so it’s
immediate that innovation decreases equilibrium proﬁtability.) Let ¯ mi be the ith column
of ¯ A
£
I − υd¯ l









> λF (A,l,υ,d). (48)
24But it’s a theorem on square matrices (Roemer, 1981, p. 110) that for any positive










or these three expressions are equal. So (48) implies that if p∗ ¯ mi/p∗
i >p ∗ ¯ mj/p∗
j for some i
and j,t h e n
λF








and that if instead p∗ ¯ mi/p∗
i = p∗ ¯ mj/p∗
j for all i and j,t h e n
λF







It follows in either case that λF
¡ ¯ A,¯ l,υ,d
¢
> λF (A,l,υ,d) and therefore that
¯ r∗ <r ∗;( 5 0 )
the capital-using, labor-saving technical changes that satisfy (41) and (43), though they
raise proﬁts in the old prices, lower the equilibrium proﬁtr a t e . 10 Bargaining drives the
crucial wedge between individual and collective cost criteria, and in the appendix I
describe a condition under which the probability of self-defeating technical change is
increasing in workers’ power β.
This argument leaves open the possibility that capitalists might revert to a discarded
activity because its costs are lower than those of the adopted activity in the new prices.
10I haven’t given any reason to suppose that technical changes will indeed satisfy those inequalities over
time, so this conclusion does not establish a tendency for the proﬁtr a t et of a l l .
25However in the numerical economies that I’ve looked at, though some innovations that
lower the equilibrium proﬁt rate are unsustainable in that sense, others are indeed
sustained in the new equilibrium even by proﬁtmaximizing capitalists who remember their
technological pasts.
Imagine that some capitalists draw one of these sustainable, proﬁtability-depressing
innovations. And suppose that price-of-production equilibria are asymptotically stable and
the convergence to them fast. Then the capitalists would all be better oﬀ were they all to
consult the criterion of collective cost and discard the innovation rather than maximize
their own current proﬁts by implementing it. But then it’s also true that, whatever the
other capitalists do, each does better by maximizing those proﬁts and innovating.
Technical change has here the prisoners’-dilemma ﬂavor that’s often attributed to Marx’s
own arguments but that’s proven so diﬃcult to establish in his terms.11
5750 words including the appendix, references, and notes.
11Compare the argument of Foley (1986, pp. 136-9) and Franke (1999) that, where Okishio’s constant real
wage gives way to a constant wage share, cost-reducing technical change can bring down the general proﬁt
rate. Instead of appealing to an aggregate boundary condition, the new argument follows the one-sector














A + l (51)





= {ρ0 (υ)p∗A + l}M (υ). (52)
where
M (υ) ≡ [I − (1 + ρ(υ))A]
−1 (53)





d =0={ρ0 (υ)p∗A + l}M (υ)d. (54)
From the num´ eraire condition, the fact that prices satisfy
p∗ = υlM (υ), (55)
and the deﬁnition



















−1 z∗ + p∗
´
, (57)
and substitution from (56) and (57) into (20) yields (22).
Satisfaction of the inequalities (41) and (43)











− (1 + r∗)p∗¯ aj
+βl−1









υlj (1 − η)






µ<µ 1 (η) ≡
υlj (1 − η)
(1 + r∗)p∗aj +
1+( 1− βη)(1− β)
−1 r∗
1+r∗ . (58)





(µ − 1) >
υlj (1 − η)
p∗aj .
28or
µ>µ 0 (η) ≡







Evidently µ1 (η) is greater or less than µ0 (η) according as η is less or greater than 1. So
for any 0 < η < 1, there’s an interval (µ0 (η),µ 1 (η)) with µ0 (η) > 1 such that for µ in
that interval (µ,η)s a t i s ﬁes both inequalities.
Also for any 0 < η < 1,µ 1 (η) − µ0 (η)i ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nβ, and therefore so must be
Z 1
0
(µ1 (η) − µ0 (η))dη,
the area of the closure of the region in which both inequalities hold. Because equilibrium
commodity prices are independent of β, there is associated with every (A,l,υ,d) a mapping










p∗aj for some j and for some µ,η in T
¾
such that a switch to an activity in φT, evaluated in the equilibrium prices for (A,l,υ,d),
yields proportional rates of labor-productivity and capital-cost change that live in T.I fa t
(A,l,υ,d) the probability measure describing the distribution of prospective new activities
assigns a greater probability to φT, the greater the area of T, then the probability of
drawing an innovation that satisﬁes (41) and (43) is increasing in β.
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